Taking pills for developmental ails in Southern Brazil: The biologization of adolescence?  by Béhague, Dominique P.
lable at ScienceDirect
Social Science & Medicine 143 (2015) 320e328Contents lists avaiSocial Science & Medicine
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/socscimedTaking pills for developmental ails in Southern Brazil: The
biologization of adolescence?
Dominique P. Behague a, b, c, *
a Vanderbilt University, USA
b King's College London, UK
c London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, UKa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Available online 13 November 2014
Keywords:
Brazil
Child psychiatry
Pharmaceuticals
Psychoanalysis
Epistemology
Prototype
Medicalization* Medicine, Health and Society, Vanderbilt Univer
derbilt Place, Nashville, TN 37235-1665, USA.
E-mail address: Dominique.Behague@vanderbilt.e
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.11.028
0277-9536/© 2014 The Author. Published by Elseviera b s t r a c t
In the late 1990s researchers in Pelotas Southern Brazil began documenting what they considered to be
unacceptably high rates of licensed psychotropic use among individuals of all ages, including youth. This
came as a surprise, since the vast majority of psychiatrists in Pelotas draw on psychoanalytic theory and
approach pharmaceutical use, especially for children and adolescents, in a consciously tempered way.
Drawing from a longitudinal ethnographic sub-study, part of a larger 1982 birth cohort study, this paper
follows the circuitous trajectories of emergent pharma-patterns among “shantytown” youth over a ten-
year period, exploring the thickly layered and often moralized contingencies in which psychodynamic
psychiatrists' intention to resist excessive pharmaceuticalization both succeed and crumble. I juxtapose
these trajectories with the growing salience of an “anti-biologizing” explanatory framework that psy-
chiatrists and researchers are using to pre-empt the kind of diagnostics-driven “biopsychiatrization” so
prevalent in North America. My analysis suggests that psychiatrists' use of this framework ironically
contributes to their failed attempts to “resist” pharmaceuticalization.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
In the 1990s researchers in Pelotas, Southern Brazil, began
documenting what they considered to be unacceptably high rates
of psychotropic use among individuals of all ages (Rodrigues et al.,
2006). For many, this was unsettling news. Data suggested that
much of this use resulted from prescriptions written by psychia-
trists, yet the vast majority of psychiatrists in Pelotas are psycho-
dynamic in orientation and though they have been prescribing
medications since the 1950s, they have always done so in a
consciously tempered and temporary way, subservient to the
deeper work of psychodynamic therapy. Elevated levels of psy-
chotropic medication-use among children and youth came as a
particular surprise, since Pelotense child psychiatrists rely on the
works of Heinz Kohut and Donald Winnicott, amongst others, for
whom environment and sociality are therapeutically central. The
impetus to be cautious about psychotropic drugs has only grown
since Brazil's de-institutionalization movement of the 1990s.sity, PMB 351665, 2301 Van-
du.
Ltd. This is an open access articleRejecting both the elitism of “pure” psychoanalysis and bio-
neurological models of the brain, Pelotense psychiatrists have
worked hard to create a re-invigorated, decentralized, and demo-
cratic social psychiatry.
How might one analyze this paradox? Are therapists saying one
thing and doing another? Are patients and parents demanding
pharmaceuticals in ways that challenge therapists' ideals? Perhaps
all are being subtly persuaded by larger forces: the globalization of
diagnostic manuals, bioscience, the market, and industry?
These are the questions that Pelotense psychiatrists and re-
searchers are themselves beginning to ask. Referring to interna-
tional literature concerned with the globalization of Anglophone
biopsychiatry (e.g. Watters, 2010), many are concerned that a
rapidly globalizing and highly-proﬁtable pharmaceuticalized North
American model of the brain will soon pervade and that psycho-
dynamic orientations will in turn subside. I was often told, for
example, that newly emerging diagnoses in biopsychiatry such as
depression and attention-deﬁcit disorder (ADD) are “socially con-
structed” symbols of Anglo neuro-psychiatry, canonized in diag-
nostic manuals and backed by industry. Or, even more powerfully,
that therapists who are unable to “resist pharmaceuticalization,”
prescribing when unnecessary or failing to transition patients offunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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globalization of biopsychiatric ways of reasoning.
It would be tempting to adopt my interlocutors' interpretative
framework and assume that will only be a matter of time before
biopsychiatry comes to dominate over dwindling socially-
psychodynamics orientations. Yet psychiatrists' emphasis on a
biologizing episteme as the key modality through which pro-
fessionals and patients are persuaded to prescribe and use phar-
maceuticals seemedmisplaced. On the grounde in everyday life, in
clinics, in formal interviews e the language of the brain and bio-
logical immutability rarely surfaced spontaneously or in any sus-
tained way. And, as scholars have shown (and my interlocutors
frequently acknowledged), psychodynamic theories are not
impervious to pharmaceutical reductions (Metzl, 2003), nor does
pharmaceuticalization always proceed through biologizing logics
(Kitanaka, 2012; Lakoff, 2006). There is clearly more at play in
pharmaceuticalization andmore at stake, also, in the rise of an anti-
biologizing anti-pharma episteme.
In this paper, I follow the circuitous trajectories of emergent
pharma-practices among “shantytown” youth over a ten-year
period, exploring the thickly layered contingencies through which
psychodynamic psychiatrists' intention to resist excessive phar-
maceuticalization both succeed and crumble. I juxtapose these
contingencies with the way Pelotense therapists variously
construct knowledge about the diverse therapeutic trajectories
they observe and help to produce. Of the various ways of knowing
that are at play, I give speciﬁc attention the increasingly salience of
an anti-biopsychiatric episteme. Why is this episteme compelling if
biopsychiatric logics are not pervasive? How does it seep into and
transform clinical and social life, shaping lives of therapists and
patients alike? And what other ways of knowing does it obscure
from view?
My answer to these questions points to the interplay of two
epistemic modalities for understanding pill-taking e the (ratio-
nalist) explanatory model and the (morally-infused) prototype. I
explore how these modalities become entangled with therapeutic
practices, mental states, and life-course trajectories. Among the
many consequences produced by this entanglement is this one:
reliance on explanatory models of how biopsychiatric logics hold
sway (or can be resisted) diverts attention from the broader moral,
social, structural, and economic contingencies that drive (or
circumvent) pharmaceuticalization. This reliance paradoxically
contributes to psychiatrists' failed attempts to “resist” pharma-
ceuticalization, thus helping to produce an emergent bio-
therapeutic form.
2. Methods
I draw empirical material from long-term (1997e2007) ﬁeld-
work with an array of experts (N ¼ 92), including therapists, school
staff, local government ofﬁcials, those involved in grass-roots
movements, and with a sample of 96 young people and their
families. These young people were selected at random from a pool
of participants interviewed in the 1997 survey of the 1982 Pelotas
birth cohort study, a prospective ongoing study of 5914 children
(Victora et al., 2003). Random sampling was used not because we
intended to conduct probabilistic analyses, but because we sought
to capture a full array of life-course experiences, including those of
particularly introverted and socially isolated youth.
Using participant observation and repeated semi-structured and
informal interviewing with youth, their mothers and other key
family members and friends, our research was conducted over a
decade in the lives of these youths, from the time they were 15 to
their 26th birthdays (from 1997/98e2007/08). Fieldwork was
conducted by myself, another anthropologist, and four researchassistants (see Behague et al., 2008; Victora et al., 2003 for meth-
odological and analytical details). Ethics approval was obtained
from the Federal University of Pelotas' Faculty of Medicine ethics
board at each new follow-up; informed consent was elicited from
participants at each of these. When cohort children were under 18
years of age, informed consent was obtained from parents and
children; once over 18 years of age, informed consent was obtained
only from cohort youth.
3. Theorizing the social life of ways of knowing
In the early 1980s, Allan Young called attention to the theoret-
ical limitations of the “explanatory model” approach for under-
standing howpatients' make sense of their illnesses (Young,1982a).
The explanatory model was originally proposed by Arthur Klein-
man in the 1970s as a framework for use in both research and the
clinical encounter, and it continues to be widely used, especially for
promoting cultural sensitivity in the clinic. Young argued that
explanatory models, though useful pedagogically, are rationalist
forms of knowledge premised on linear logics and causal proposi-
tions. Because explanatory models presuppose that the classiﬁca-
tion of etiology, symptoms, and treatment is a central feature in all
ways of knowing, they fail to recognize the myriad and non-linear
ways people produce knowledge about health and illness (Young,
1982a).
Young's argument was initially built upon empirical work with
‘lay’ knowledge systems in which cause-and-effect logics are not
always central deﬁning characteristics. But he and other scholars
have also pointed to the ways rationalist assumptions can skew our
understandings of how biomedicine becomes persuasive and
authoritative (Lock et al., 2000; Young, 1980). This argument is a
more difﬁcult one to make, and may appear counter-intuitive, for
biomedicine's unparalleled power rests precisely on its “rational-
ity”: the search for clear codiﬁcation and causal relationship, the
operational value of simpliﬁcation, and the lure of quick ﬁxes
(Good, 1994). Indeed, researchers have consistently underscored
the way simplifying theories of brain disorders, used in highly
effective ways by industry, constitute the key mechanism through
which widespread acceptance of speciﬁc diagnostic categories and
associated psychotropic medications have proliferated (Conrad and
Bergey, 2014; Timimi, 2005).
Yet I want to argue that a great deal of social science research on
biomedicine privileges its bioepistemic powers, over and above
other forces at play. In Pelotas, I am not convinced that “resistance”
to “bioepistemic” rationales actually accounts for the tempered use
of pharmaceuticals that psychodynamic psychiatrists strive for, nor
do I think that bioepistemic rationales are core to the recent rise in
psychotropic use. Yet this is precisely the story e an explanatory
model e that has gained circulation globally (e.g. Watters, 2010),
and it is the story that Pelotense therapists and experts are
beginning to endorse as their own. This explanatory model can be
put succinctly thus: the notion that brain disorders are caused by
underlying biologicaleneurological phenomenon and can be
treated with pharmaceuticals underpins widespread acceptance of
and desire for pill-taking. Within this model is the converse notion:
namely, if more complex understanding of suffering linked tomind,
person and society are retained, all would see the pill for it is: a
bioreductionist quick ﬁx with potentially long-term negative ef-
fects. I will call this an explanatory model of bioepistemic authority.
This explanatory model is notmerely a theoretical abstraction. It
has a social life and is in this sense ‘operative.’ Succinct and
persuasive in its etiological attributions, its retelling creates a
unifying, provocative, and stabilizing call-to-action (L€owy,1988). As
I became attentive to the contexts inwhich an explanatorymodel of
bioepistemic authority is elicited, I noticed that therapists, teachers,
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moments: at the frustrating limits of what social psychiatry can do
to rectify deep suffering; in enthusiastic instances of psychody-
namic vindication; and most importantly, in response to the moral
discomforts of other less visible ways of knowing that are linked to
moral judgments on what pharmaceutics are, do and mean.
Importantly, I show that these judgments are made against the
backdrop of intertwined ideas about class, poverty and analytical
capacity.
Thesemorally-infused and informal ways of knowing are akin to
Young's notion of the “prototype.” Prototypes are stories of sickness
episodes that people have witnessed or learned about and they are
used to frame subsequent episodes, producing knowledge in
disorderly non-causal ways (Young,1982a,b). I began to think about
prototypes when I noticed that the kinds of therapeutic languages
and practices used by therapist, parents, and patients varied
depending on patients' socio-economic status and age. Broadly put,
a psychodynamic language of “adolescent” crisis and trans-
formation resonated more intensely in the mid to late teen years
and among upper-middle class and upwardly mobile youth. In
contrast, a medical language of behavior and containment, with
hypothesized diagnoses of attention and conduct problems,
appeared more readily for youth in lower socio-economic status
and at younger ages. Over time, these two patterns developed into
different kinds of psychotropic use, one more psychodynamic,
temporary and transformative, and the other more stagnating,
chronic and prone to biotheorizing. Of the 96 youth in the ethno-
graphic sample, 19 were prescribed a psychotropic medication at
some point in their life; of these, 6 usedmedications in a temporary
way, as therapists intend, whereas 13 entered into what therapists
themselves identiﬁed as an unproductive and stagnatingmedicated
therapeutic trajectory. As overarching patterns, these two
prototypes proved to be salient in epidemiological analyses of the
larger 1982 cohort samples as well (Behague, 2004).
In what follows, I introduce two young women, Juliane and
Rosane, whose life experiences I take to be representative of the
varied forces that go into the making of these two patterned pro-
totypes. I take these prototypes to be indicative of two contrasting
“kinds” of people (Hacking, 1995) or “person-making” regimes
(Martin, 2006). Though reproduced in contemporary forms of self-
making, they hark back to late 19th/early 20th century Romantic
notions of the “elite” psyche, a Freudian aesthetic that juxtaposes
upper class intellectualism against the “retrograde” psyche of the
underclass (Duarte, 1999e2000). Most psychiatrists, aware of the
problematic ethical legacies of this history, claim this aesthetic to
have been largely overcome. Yet I will demonstrate that these two
prototypes are very much alive, and that they come to life in
therapeutic routines as “ethical exemplars” (Laidlaw, 2013). And
here is the crux of my argument: when therapists sense the moral
discomfort these exemplars produce, they revert to a simpler
explanatory model hinging on the powers of bioepistemic
authority.
4. The “storm and stress” benchmark
For Juliane, the end of childhood and beginning of adolescence
began at age 13 not with menstruation and ﬁrst boyfriends, but
with the death of her father, Emilio. Feelings of mourning and
betrayal intensiﬁed when Juliane's family discovered that Emilio
had a second “wife” and three children in a neighboring city.
Juliane's family, already living well under the poverty in one of
Pelotas' newest shanties, underwent rapid downward mobility and
Vera, Juliane's mother, unable to make ends meet, was forced to
send her children to live with extended family members for weeks
at a time. Vera's recollections of these early years were both blurredand strikingly concise. Juliane began spending more time “on the
streets,” at times for days on end. Illicit drug-use became part of her
everyday experience, as did exposure to street violence and sexual
encounters she did not always want. At age 16, she began having
“visions” and talking of “wanting it all to go away.” Vera explained
that during her “crises,” Juliane would “talk incoherently and
wander anxiously through the house, believing it haunted by
spirits.” Vera had long been taking her children to a Kardecist
center and so she sought help from a Spiritist healer, but Juliane
improved only temporarily. During another crisis, Vera rushed her
daughter to Pelotas' one remaining psychiatric hospital. The
attending psychiatrist admitted Juliane but then discharged her a
few hours later, telling her to follow-up at her local clinic. Though
Vera made an appointment, Juliane failed to attend.
Juliane had not abandoned school and eventually Juliane's
teacher took her to visit the school psychologist, Lizette. Like the
vast majority of young people referred to a school psychologist,
Juliane was highly skeptical; she viewed teachers, school staff, and
therapists as inherently elitist and thus only superﬁcially caring. Yet
Lizette's focus on Juliane's justiﬁably difﬁcult “adolescent turmoil”
intrigued Juliane. Adolescence is always turbulent, Lizette
explained, and Juliane's would bemore protracted thanmost, given
her life circumstances. Yet it would entail not just anxiety and
sorrow, but the acquisition of important abilities e analytical,
reﬂective, social, and pragmatic. The notion of adolescence as
agency-inducing comforted Juliane, as did its de-stigmatizing
framing. She returned to therapy and Lizette began to involve
Juliane's teacher and mother in the process. “The psychologist
would tell my mother to just let me be,” Juliane recalled, “and not
criticize [when I was acting strange]. Once the psychologist asked
mewhy I no longer cried asmuch. I told her, ‘because father toldme
to stop. He is taking care of me. He isn't here, but he tells me I must
go to school. If not he will get angry with me.’ Well, when I told my
mother this, we were walking down the street holding hands. She
looked at mewith those big eyes, her jaw dropped, and she let go of
my hand.”
The normalization of Juliane's experiences was linked to her
appreciation of the “democratizing” nature of the clinical
encounter. Juliane toldme, with some surprise, how Lizette actually
listened and refrained from simply telling her “how to behave” as
teachers so often did. Juliane explained that she enjoyed talking to
Lizette because it showed her that the two of themweren't “all that
different,” even though Lizette was clearly middle class. Lizette, in
turn, reﬂected on how Juliane had a spark, a drive for change and
upward mobility that she did not frequently encounter, making her
an ideal candidate for in-depth therapy. Underpinning these in-
terpretations was a subtly moralized linking of the analytical ca-
pacity for psychological transformation with the avid desire for
upward mobility e a moral-pedagogic stance that would gain force
in the context of Juliane's future encounters with a psychiatrist.
Several elements were critical to Juliane's initial productive
engagement with therapy: clinical democratization, normalization
of symptoms, concerted effort to work with school and home, and
recognition of Juliane's difﬁcult life circumstances. Both Juliane and
Lizette made explicit reference to these elements as they planned
next therapeutic steps. Yet when I asked Lizette in a formal inter-
view about her somewhat unusual success with Juliane, she gave
me a response that I subsequently heard in meetings and in-
terviews time and again e a response that I identiﬁed to be an
explanatory model focused on the power of a psychodynamic
interpretation to resist facile bioreductionism, to inculcate a desire
for something more than medication. “We have a problemwith the
medicalization of education,” she explained, “Everyone, even
teachers are taking pills. What happens is you become more
distanced from affect. Medicine becomes a mordaça (gag, muzzle).
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The work of therapy, she continued, is not a simple ﬁx; the patient
needs to be shown the value of a slower therapeutic pace.
The pace was indeed slow and the transformation that Juliane
eventually experienced emerged only after many setbacks. There
were long periods of time when Juliane withdrew from school and
from visiting Lizette, and in her 17th year, during yet another crisis,
Vera took Juliane to hospital where she was given a referral to a
public sector psychiatrist. This time, Juliane was more accepting
and she met with the psychiatrist, Luiz. Upon discovering Juliane's
suicidal thoughts, Luiz prescribed an anti-depressant. Like Lizette,
he foregrounded not diagnosis or medication but rather the expe-
rience of adolescence as a transitional state. He told Juliane that the
medicationwas a temporary measure and that they would focus on
broad-ranging “incremental” rehabilitation. Juliane feared the anti-
depressants' potential side effects and worried they might be
addictive. Yet her desire for much-needed respite outweighed
these concerns. “It might be the only way to get better. It will give
me some time,” she explained. She initiated a medicated psycho-
dynamic journey with the optimistic notion that the end of
adolescence would bring the end of medication and reduction in
distress.
The ﬂuid and normalizing conceptualization of adolescence that
both Luiz and Lizette referred to recalls psychodynamic-
psychologist Stanley Hall's early 20th century theory of adoles-
cent “storm-and-stress,” one that sanctions a slow and protected
developmental pace. Relative to his contemporaries, Hall ascribed
to a more optimistic Lamarckian interpretation of evolutionary
theory; and he was the ﬁrst to argue that a child's “developmental”
period ran well into “adolescence” and that adolescence consti-
tuted a key “metamorphic” phase created through the clash of
“primitive” (child-like) and “civilized” (adult) psychologies.
Contemporary permutations of this theory see adolescence as a
“moratorium,” a period of non-committal experimentation with
self and society (Cairns, 1998).
As I observed Juliane move toward a “Hallesque” trans-
formation, I noticed how “the social” became a source of knowledge
for theorizing cause and seeking therapeutic improvement. Luiz
understood Juliane to be caught in a “dialectic” between societal
(and class) conﬂicts and internal adolescent conﬂict. He, like others,
explicitly referred to self-psychology theorists, such as Heinz Kohut
and Erik Erikson, who made their canonical mark by exploring how
the social acts in and through the individual. As one of Luiz’ col-
leagues stated, “The emergency of our current social angst, the
transition to democracy, a history of dictatorships, is placed into the
adolescent. This complicates what is already a turbulent life phase.”
Like others, Luiz conceptualized adolescence as a unique opportu-
nity for broader social change. “We all say the subject lives in a
depressive [dysfunctional] society, and we leave it at that. Throw
[our] hands up (shrugs shoulders). Well, if that's the case, then we
need even more to not medicate. We must investigate the person's
life struggles, and overcome these.”
For Juliane, the idea that her problems were related to the
harshness of the social world rather than to her speciﬁc psycho-
logical or cognitive “failings” was enthusiastically received. Luiz
himself never presumed that Juliane's situation would improve
only through her own analytic work. Like Lizette, he worked with
Juliane's teachers and mother, and he encouraged Juliane to seek
support and make concrete changes. For Juliane, this included,
quite centrally, an intensiﬁcation of her “Spiritist studies” and
increased participation in her local shantytown neighborhood as-
sociation, where she helped with several initiatives, from
canvassing the neighborhood to preparing for the next bingo game.
As she herself indicated, religion and activism gave her a sense of
social belonging and it helped her in school, for she learned how toengage in her life without “thinking too much” and by focusing on
“smaller steps.”
The social also seeped into the clinic via Luiz's democratizing
ethos. He did not exempt himself e a member of the upper-middle
class e from scrutiny and considered “transference” dynamics to
include the social conﬂicts and class-distinctions that young people
such as Juliane experience on a daily basis. Juliane, in turn,
welcomed the legitimacy this bestowed. “I was worried they
[psychologist and psychiatrist] would just tell me what to do,” she
explained, “what was wrong with me… but he talked to me like I
was any other person.” For Luiz, this democratizing attitude helped
to increase empathy. Yet the lessening of class differentials also
created an opportunity for the socialization of Juliane into a middle
class value-system; it drew Juliane into a different world view and
allowed her to see that not all members of the upper-class are
disparaging. In humanizing Luiz, her desire for upward mobility
grew, as did her desire for Luiz'smoral-pedagogic support in seeking
that mobility.
James Laidlaw's discussion of the role of “exemplars” in ethical
life is eminently useful here. He argues that moral life is shaped not
simply by rules and rationalized obligations. Rather, “individuals
cultivate themselves as ethical subjects in relation to chosen ex-
emplars; [that is] historical heroes or living people they interact
with and chose as ‘teacher’ in their own personal development”
(Laidlaw, 2013: 83). Exemplars mediate between fact and values,
between what is and what should be (p. 85); they are pedagogic
prototypes. In Luiz Juliane saw an exemplar. As her situation
improved, Luiz, in turn, looked upon her as his exemplar, a proto-
type of the ‘good’ patient qualities that allow psychodynamic
techniques to work. Indeed, when comparing patients, Luiz, like
Lizette before him, highlighted those unique personal-moral
qualities that made Juliane “capable” of insight. “Adolescents [like
her],” he explained, elicit a greater sense of promise because they
come with “fewer defenses…. Reﬂection is very painful, [but it is]
at the heart of development for the adolescent.” Youth who were
deemed capable of transforming this pain into adolescent-infused
“opportunity” tended to embrace rather than critique the drive
for upwardmobility (as many shantytownyouth do); this fact alone
underscores that what became central in Juliane's emerging clinical
form was not epistemic faith in anti-biologizing psychodynamic
analysis, but rather entrenched socialeethical hierarchies.
It was in the context of this morally-charged enactment of
adolescence that stopping medication became as importante if not
more important e than the sanctioned reprieve it represented: no
longer just a therapeutic aim, it became a moral act. The impending
“end” of adolescence troubled Juliane. “I'm not too worried about
the [adult] responsibilities I have to take on,” she told me, “but I feel
anxious about losing my adolescence, about not taking full
advantage of it.” Advantage how, I asked? Juliane spoke about
wanting to feel free to be a “crazy” adolescent. But she also worried
that shemight not be able, adult-enough, to stop her medication, to
wean herself of the therapeutic supports she nowhad in place. How
would she know if her adolescence was coming to an end and what
if she failed? Though fearing failure, the moral imperative to build
strength and well-being during adolescence became increasingly
salient. This therapeutic framing was starkly reafﬁrmed when
Juliane explained that one key risk of psychotropic-use was the
slippery slope of addiction and entrenched destitution. “These
medications aren't so different from street drugs. Whether its
sleeping pills, anti-depressants or street stuff, your life can easily
degrade.”
Juliane eventually proved herself to be capable. Her incremental
trajectory to a more stable situation continued, and Juliane and Luiz
decided it was time she transition into talk therapy only. Increased
participation in social life, in her Spiritist studies and her
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friends and family were identiﬁed as key signs of her readiness to
withdraw medication. Luiz began to see her more intermittently
while Lizette continued seeing her in the school setting. “With
time,” Juliane recalled, “I was able to talk to the psychologist, who
knows a ton about me. This was more important than any medi-
cation. Now when I need to talk, I let it loose!” That Juliane could
legitimately “extend” her adolescence when needing some respite
also resonated powerfully: “When those crazy adolescent emotions
attack me, I go to see [Lizette]. Poor thing (laughing), she sits there
as I talk, and I joke with her [pretending to be her therapist]. I tell
her, ‘I bet you're dying for me to give you a clean bill of health.’ She
jokes back, ‘I'm the one that's dying to give you a clean bill of
health!’”
The playful inversion of the therapistepatient relationship in
this exchange demonstrates just how potent Lizette's “exemplar”
role became in shaping the pedagogic prototype that Juliane came
to personify. By age 18, Juliane's crises had largely abated. Luiz
continued encouraging her to engage in multi-institutional sources
of support. By the time Juliane turned 19 she had stopped medi-
cation completely, held a part-time job, had a close circle of friends,
was near to completing her secondary education, and had become
engaged to a young man with a high school degree and a good job.
Two years later, she and her ﬁance migrated away from their
parental homes and began living in a ﬂat, away from their natal
shanty community.
Juliane's life-trajectory was unique but by no means singular.
The visible minority of women who shared her experiences are
indicative of an emerging social trend. Most overcame their
struggles in large part because education, civic organization, reli-
gion, family, and transformative psychodynamics converged to
create an upwardly mobile “adolescent” form of personhood. Their
achievements in education alone were clearly exceptional vis-a-vis
the norm for those with similar socio-economic backgrounds.
Seeped in an aura of optimism, a few went further, entering college
to pursue careers in psychology, social work, and teaching e pro-
fessions where helping others to “develop” were identiﬁed as
markers of their own psychodynamic success.
That Juliane's transformation was as structurally supported as it
was internalwas evident to Juliane, Lizette, Luiz, hermother, andher
teachers. Though all had nurtured a therapeutically meaningful
adolescent identity, and though this identity had at times been
imbued with ethical judgments on which “kinds of people” are
deemed capable of achieving it, rarely had it been divorced from the
social contexts that enabled it to emerge. This was set to change.
Throughout her early 20s, Juliane reconstructed her life narra-
tive to focus quite centrally on her maturation, on how she had
managed to “resolve her adolescence,” conquer her identity, ach-
ieve a legitimate place in society, and avoid any sort of dependency,
be it chemical or inter-personal. “The anti-depressant was passing
for me,” she stated, “it just helps a bit … Today, I know how to be
calmer, to have a more tranquil attitude. I think, I reﬂect. What do I
want, what do I not want. Not being able to do that characterizes
the infantile side of adolescence.” She rarely recalled her Spiritist
studies or neighborhood association activities, the institutional
supports she had received in school, her growing friendships, or the
direct effects of having a more stable income. Instead, she produced
a classic explanatory framework centered on the transformative
power of deep self-fashioning to successfully “resist” bio-
reductionist pharmaceuticalization.
In moments of reﬂection more distanced from actual case-
histories, therapists also produced similar narrative re-
constructions. Luiz, for example, when summing up Juliane's case
in a formal interview, relied on an explanatory framework that
made causal inferences about the over-riding therapeutic power ofreﬂective capacity e of the appreciation for deep analysis and the
perils of medication. Yet for both him and Juliane, reverberating
behind the surface meaning of this explanatory model was the
middle-class ethical exemplar that had been in the making all
along, a morally charged prototype of the type of patient who is
psychological capable of withdrawing medication. Poignantly, in
one of my last visits, Juliane off-handedly compared her life-
trajectory with those of some of her childhood peers whose lives
“on the streets” had led to near-total school truancy, joblessness,
and dependency on both prescription and illegal drugs.
This self-vindicating knowledge-form recalls classic critiques of
conservative forms of psychoanalysis. Fernando Duarte has argued
that psychodynamic traditions in Brazil are saturated in Weberian
instrumentalism, one in which Freudian-inspired ideologies
became integral to the elite's “civilizing” mission of the early 20th
century and to the reproduction of class distinctions (Duarte,
1999e2000: 156). Not only are certain kinds of person-types be-
ing recreated, but young women's gravitation to “self-making”
professions such as teaching, psychology, and social work re-
produces the person-making apparatus. Dominic Boyer argues that
unlike industrial labor, products of contemporary “mental labor”
are inextricably bound to personhood, since producers of mental
labor have themselves to be produced if their “commodities” are to
be given a distinctive form (Boyer, 2005: 251). Similarly, Juliane and
her therapists became embroiled in a type of mental labor that
produced both future producers of mental labor and a broader
compelling justiﬁcation for their work e that is, resistance to
pharmaceuticalization.
5. Arrested adolescent development
The ironies of Juliane's storm-and-stress development are
particular starkwhen contrastedwith the lives of youth at the other
end of the spectrum. Though a developmental notion of “adoles-
cence” has become so commonplace that virtually all youth hoped
to “realize” it, within a year or two of initiating adolescence, most
low-income youth were quick to point out that poverty and lack of
opportunity e rather than “psychological development” e lay at
the heart of their difﬁculties. Referrals to therapy were thus prone
to sensitive politics of blame, as feelings of undue culpability mired
therapeutic encounters. What then happens to therapeutic jour-
neys, and to the production of knowledge about pharmaceuticals,
in the absence of a Hallesque “storm-and-stress” adolescence?
Abject poverty and repeated migration marked Rosane's child-
hood and teen years. Rosane recalled one of her parents' moves as
particularly unsettling. Precipitated by rumors that the local gov-
ernment held plans to level all illegal squatter homes in their
community, they salvaged as many belongings as they could carry
and moved to Rosane's aunt's home, situated in one of Pelotas's
most removed peri-urban settlements. The nearest school was a
45-min walk away. Rosane, then 13, and her younger siblings did
their best to settle into new classes of unknown peers run by, as
Rosane once described, ill-humored teachers. In an effort to help
their parents, she began skipping class to work biscates (informal
petty jobs) and over the ensuing year, she found herself “giving up”
in school, failing exams and getting into ﬁghts with classmates. In
her 14th year, her teacher sent her to the school psychologist,
highlighting problemas de conduta (conduct problems) and falta de
attençao (lack of attention). As with Juliane, the school psychologist
underscored the tempered and normative even “protective” qual-
ities of adolescence, if only Rosane could attend school more
regularly and be given some tranquil time at home. The psycholo-
gist invited Rosane to return the week after and sent a note home
suggesting Rosane'smother, Fernanda, make an appointment at her
local clinic with the attending psychiatrist.
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psychologist introduced ﬂew in the face of the deprivation Rosane
felt continuously undermined her efforts. “Adolescence? Ha! They
talk about adolescence,” she once retorted, “that doesn't exist. I'm
14, but it will never exist for me.” Though Rosane compliedwith the
request that she visit the psychologist again, she was dismissive,
insinuating that classist sentiments had been at the heart of her
teacher's referral. “It's not fair,” she said, “they always peg us. All
this talk theywant, it's just to tell us what to do, what is wrong with
‘us’ [shantytown] kids.” That she had approached her adolescence
with hope made the therapeutic encounter all the more bitter.
Fernanda empathized with Rosane's sentiments, and often
echoed her daughter's strong sense of social injustice. Yet Rosane's
state continued to worsen and because Fernanda no longer knew
how to respond to her daughter's frequent outbursts, crying epi-
sodes, and screaming attacks, she sought help at her local clinic.
The attending physician explained that Rosane was externalizing
her emotions in a way that presented as conduct problems and
inattention only because her immaturity still precluded her ability
to articulate and process her troubles. Acknowledging the family's
difﬁcult home life and the oft-tense school environments that
youth must endure, he did not want to resort to an ADHD diagnosis
and explained that Rosane's behaviors signaled underlying (but
temporary) anxiety and depression, a natural response to difﬁcult
situations. He prescribed an anti-depressant, explained the medi-
cation to be a stop-gap, and asked Rosane and Fernanda to return in
two weeks' time for a “proper in-depth analysis” of her situation
with the clinic psychiatrist.
At a conceptual level, this physician used both a socially sensi-
tive stance, similar to that Luiz and Lizette had employed, and an
anti-biologizing ethos. Yet in the absence of the more immediately
pragmatic, engaged and multi-pronged approach that seems to
have made a difference for Juliane, Rosane's situation worsened.
She took the medication for only a week, never returned to the
clinic, and her rejection of all things psychological increased. She
told me that her problems related not to depression or “immatu-
rity” but to the converse. “I haven't had an adolescence,” she said,
“school failed me… all that I have experienced e it made me grow
up too quickly.” Even so, she remained in school for the better part
of her 15th and 16th years, and not so infrequently, her teachers
would send her to the school psychologist for “misbehavior” or
“lack of concentration.” According to Rosane, these sessions usually
lasted a quarter of an hour and consisted of misplaced questions to
which Rosane responded in short “yes's” and “no's.”
As Rosane's emotional responses grew more strained, a new
knowledge-form gained visibility: a loosely articulated morally-
imbued prototype that I understood to be the converse of what
Juliane's life came to represent. Rosane told me that her teachers
“just keep telling me I'm acting childish” and that the psychologist
made reference to her “disorganized” development. The psychol-
ogist, in turn, told me that Rosane, unable or unwilling to engage
in deep analysis, was prone to the dangerous medicated patch-
work that was becoming so common in schools. Fernanda herself
began using developmental language to compel her daughter to
action: “Rosane's adolescent explosions are still there. She still
wants to be a child … but it is time for her to face up.” Rosane's
own self-reﬂections also changed, as she internalized these
developmental notions, and began speaking of weepiness,
adolescent introversion, even identity confusion. “Now I see what
they meant when they talked about my adolescence,” she said,
referring to her early teen-hood, “I was such a besta (beast) back
then, without conscience. I felt like an adolescent, my emotions
were all over the place and no one, including myself, seemed to
know when it would stop. Maybe I should have stuck to the
medications.”When I asked the school psychologist to expand on Rosane's
pathological “desire for childhood,” she explained that when
different “lines” of development e cognitive, emotional, sexual e
evolve incoherently, some more quickly than others, a truncated
form of adolescence emerges, rife with anxiety and recalcitrant
behaviors. Several psychiatrists subsequently identiﬁed this theory
to be part of the conservative Freudian school of ego-psychology
established by Anna Freud and Heinz Hartman, amongst others.
Though most claimed this “decontextualized one-person theory of
development” to have fallen out of favor in Pelotas, it was precisely
this framing, a prototype e the converse of all that Juliane's “civi-
lizing” therapeutic trajectory achieved e that took hold in Rosane's
life. As Rosane's rejections of social injustice increased so did in-
terpretations of her childish (immature) quality become
entrenched, as did the burgeoning sense that perhaps she would
never be capable of adult-like introspection. Thus, by default to a
historically-entrenched knowledge-form rather than by canonical
intention, adolescence came to signal not normative “storm and
stress,” but rather the failure of the unfolding ego.
Frustrated by life, including these depictions of her character,
Rosane disengaged completely. I found it increasingly difﬁcult to
ﬁnd her at home. At ﬁrst, Fernanda made excuses for Rosane's
absence, but then told me in a shameful and saddened tone that
Rosane had “taken to the streets.” In 1999, a then 17 year old,
Rosane began dating a youngman in his early twenties, a renowned
drug user and trafﬁcker. When I caught up with her later that year,
she recounted how her life with him had “taken over,” how she
contented herself with her newfound friends, a group of marginais
[“vagabonds”], as she called them. She began experimenting with
marijuana and cocaine, and soon left school altogether. Her street-
life exposed her to levels of violence that most parents shelter their
children from through strict curfews. Within a few months, Rosane
was robbed and assaulted, and then witnessed a friend embroiled
in the drug trade die. In the two years that ensued, Rosane with-
drew, spending days at a time either in her room or on the streets.
When she “looked at herself,” she said she saw a life that had
digressed “beyond repair.”
In her 18th year, Fernanda took Rosane to the psychiatric hos-
pital. Like Juliane, shewas given a referral for outpatient psychiatric
care. Unlike Juliane, Rosane never followed up. Instead, she walked
away feeling shattered: “The hospital took me in [for a bit] but they
said this was perhaps a passing adolescent thing… The doctor told
me to ‘go home, stay home, and sleep.’ So I did … These things
happen… But until it passed, I could not look at anyone in the eye.”
She waited. At times, Rosane wondered if perhaps the notion of
“arrested development” she had encountered at the local clinic, in
school, and in her relationship with her mother, might be true. In
2000, nearing her 19th birthday, she found herself pregnant with
an unwanted child and in an unwanted relationship. She began
living with her then-boyfriend, Beto, the child's father, hoping to
turn a new leaf, at times excited for motherhood. A few months
before she gave birth, Beto died mysteriously. Though Rosane
managed to secure a regular part-time job as a cleaner in the
evenings when her grandmother could care for her baby, her
weepiness and exhaustion mounted.
At this near-tipping point, Rosane went to her local primary care
clinic. The attending psychologist referred her to a public sector
psychiatrist, Paulo. Given the severity of her symptoms and suicidal
thinking, he prescribed an anti-depressant. In good socially sensitive
psychodynamic fashion, Paulo explained medication to be a tem-
porary facilitator for the more important social-analytical work at
hand. Rosanewelcomed this thoughte it indicated, once again, that
her state might be transitional. Paulo was the ﬁrst to recognize that
Rosane's life circumstances did not lend themselves to an “adoles-
cent awakening,” yet he felt committed to supporting, with
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mental opportunity he had successfully enabled for other patients.
Even so, the creation of transformative socio-personal analysis
was thwarted almost from the start. Paulo's attempts to encourage
Rosane to “think and reﬂect,” to demonstrate that strong sense of
injustice he knew so many shantytown youth rightfully have, fell
ﬂat. Instead, exhaustion took over, interspersed with what Rosane
herself had begun to identify as “adolescent-like ﬁts” of anger.
Rosane recounted how therapy would help her “work hard” to
accept adult responsibilities, to resolve the “stresses” of adoles-
cence: “Adulthood comes when you stop the craziness, when you
can wake up and ligar (turn yourself on). Otherwise, you enter into
depression and that whole thing.” In an almost mournful way e
perhaps for a lost childhood and adolescence e she sought in
therapy the cultivation of self and social acceptance. “I am better,”
she reﬂected, in her 21st year, “but I still feel irresponsible, young…
(pause). Everything that happened to me had a good side, because
it mademe say to myselfe I'm going to stop this madness (pause). I
have lost too much time. It will pass.” Waiting became the bare-
minimum she could muster.
In reﬂecting on this situation, Paulo himself explained that pa-
tients such as Rosane can easily enter into a “medicated holding
pattern” e justiﬁed by therapists' impetus to avoid further deteri-
oration, but grossly under-problematized. This interpretation,
though spoken about in the third person, was notably reﬂexive. It
was precisely at this therapeutic crossroads e one in which the
severity of Rosane's situation collided with Paulo's disquieting
critical sensibilities e that a bioepistemic explanatory framework
emerged indirectly and jointly with a biologizing trajectory itself:
Though Rosane and Paulo had avoided clear-cut diagnosis,
Rosane's language becamemore focused on symptoms of a potential
disorder, rather than, as a social psychiatrists might want, contin-
gent states of mind that respond to difﬁcult circumstances: her
stomach aches, dizzy spells, overheated sensations, and “ﬁts”
became critical sources of information. Rosane wondered if she
“had something.” Somewhat reluctantly, Paulo began to analyze
these bodily symptoms by making reference to a psychoanalytic
theory of “somatization” in which physical ailments are seen as
idioms of the psyche. Paulo's reticence was warranted. Though a
focus on the body could in theory be helpful, like ego-psychology,
theories of somatization are recognized in Pelotas as prone to an
elitist separation of mind over body. Indeed, this framing did not
help Rosane, as she took it to mean that her problems had wors-
ened because of her inability to recognize their psychological
origins.
Rosane's sense that “something [physiological] was there”
became compounded when she attempted to wean herself off her
anti-depressant. Though following Paulo's advice, each time she
tried, she felt worse and each time she interpreted this to be proof
of her “condition.” Her lack of success then blurred the distinction
between symptom, side-effect, and withdrawal effect, producing a
new “post-pill” context for the production of knowledge. Here,
Rosane began to use a clearer diagnostic label e depression e
alongside a more biomedical immutable interpretation of her
predicaments. “My depression,” she stated, now 22 years old, “It
appeared for the ﬁrst time in adolescence and came back with the
hypertension. I had to get back onto the anti-depressants. I'm trying
to stop again, but I notice it immediately when I stop, something is
there. I'm not sure it will ever go away.”
Paulo was reticent to accept Rosane's speculative biotheorizing.
He had a niggling sense that in her case, prolonged medication-use
had dulled her, worsened her symptoms. And the search for an
alternative therapeutic trajectory did not seem e and indeed was
note completely unrealistic (see Behague, 2009 for a description of
these alternatives). Her life situation had actually improvedsomewhat; with full support from hermother, shewasmanaging to
sustain a regular work schedule while still caring for her daughter.
At other times, however, Paulo showed heightened sensitivity to
the gravity of Rosane's situation. He wondered about her capacity
for talk-therapy, suggesting that perhaps the multigenerational
weight of social, economic and personal hardship made deep
analysis futile, perhaps counter-productive. Yet even in this care-
fully posited statement, uncertainty resounded. Though he did not
articulate it as such, he recognized the slippery slope of classism
here; the historic force of the converse of Juliane's “civilizing”
psychoanalytic exemplar; the diminishing status of the “primitive”
prototype incapable of deep analysis and thus prone to somatiza-
tion, to accepting a pharmaceutical mordaça (muzzle).
It was precisely at this juncture that Paulo's position began to
shift. Seeking a less morally charged account of what he now
considered to be Rosane's pharmaceuticalized therapeutic stagna-
tion, he appealed to a more clearly articulated explanatory frame-
work focused on the causal epistemic powers of biopsychiatry.
Perhaps, he speculated, Rosane was wishing for a quick ﬁx. He
himself had used the term “depression” quite loosely and he
continued making reference to her socially-induced “nerves,” as
she once had. Perhaps therapy was not evolving into something
more, as it had for others patients he had known, because she was
somehow convinced of the indisputably bodily and biological na-
ture of the constellation of symptoms that beset her. Perhaps the
media had somehow persuaded her to adopt the more immutable
notion of depression to which she now ascribed. These explana-
tions provided Paulo with greater epistemic certainty and a speciﬁc
course of action, one that seeks to convince patients (and col-
leagues) that psychological phenomenon are complex, that the pill
is a temporary stop-gap.
This is precisely what Paulo then attempted. Losing sight of the
broader social and institutional constellations that accounted for
Rosane's therapeutic stagnation (and for the therapeutic trans-
formations that Paulo, like Luiz, had enabled in patients such as
Juliane), he focused on re-socializing Rosane to appreciate a non-
biologizing episteme. Depression is just a rough category, he told
her. The pill is just one step to other changes; it need not indicate a
static “condition.” Rosane listened and dutifully expressed a desire
for a deeper understanding of her suffering's origins and for a life
off medication. Yet even then she used corporeal terms to imagine
how talk-therapymight help her to “expel the stress and loosen the
body.” In her 23rd year, she resigned herself to the chronic mark-
ings of an adulthood struck by depression: “I knowpeoplewho take
several medications regularly,” she said “one for nerves, one to
sleep, another for depression. It's complicated. I suppose we all will
arrive at the phase of having to take those remedinhos (little med-
icines) all the time.” Rosane's position vindicated Paulo's “anti-
biologizing” position, and through repeated micro-iterations such
as these, an explanatory framework of bioepistemic authority
solidiﬁed.
This bioepistemic explanatory framework can be conceptual-
ized, following Foucault's work on discursive formations, to be an
emerging episteme, a space of dispersion and displacement
(Burchell et al., 1991: 55). In public forums of meetings and work-
shops I observed Paulo himself adopt distinctly formulated expla-
nations for the rise of psycho-pharmaceuticals in his city. “Today,”
Paulo said in one such meeting, “the failure of psychodynamics
arises largely from the demand for a quick ﬁx, on everyone's part.
This demand is the result of giving the pharmaceutical industry free
reign to ‘name’ a ‘disease’ through themarketing of a speciﬁc drug.”
This explanatory position became increasingly evident throughout
the years of my ﬁeldwork, especially as therapists extracted
themselves from the speciﬁcities of their patients' lives and
debated the issues in public meetings or responded tomy questions
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growing frequency in publications concerned with the globalizing
force of pharmaceuticalization in Brazil. This theorizing, while
familiar, even comforting to my anthropological sensibilities, also
surprised me. Though offered “critically,” it struck me as abrasive in
its dismissal of the structural complexities and long-standing
moralizing prototypes at play in both the therapeutic “successes”
and over-medicated “failures” I and my interlocutors witnessed.
6. Conclusion
The narrative reconstructions that Juliane, Rosane, and their
therapists ended with e narratives of the resilient powers of psy-
choanalytic self-making on the one hand and of the reductionist
powers of bioepistemic authority on the other e represent an
explanatory model that many in the social sciences share. It would
be inaccurate to argue that it is “false.” Biopsychiatric epistemol-
ogies are indeed emerging in Pelotas, if only, at this point, through
indirect routes, outside the realm of clearly orchestrated inten-
tional action. Patients do at times “demand” drugs and diagnostic
rigidity, especially once chronicity of medication-use sets in; and
therapists at times ﬁnd relief in providing their patients with a
simplifying bioepistemic narrative. My interlocutors are right to
raise awareness about biopsychiatric simpliﬁcations.
Yet this explanatory model is glaringly partial. It is partial at the
very basic level of the explicit articulations that people produce.
And, even if the language of the chemical brain (or some bio-
equivalent) were more prevalent in Pelotas, as it may become,
there are clear indications that this explanatory model would still
fail to adequately reﬂect empirical reality. Simply put, the attribu-
tion of pharmaceuticalization to the epistemic dimensions bio-
psychiatry, ﬁrst and foremost, fails to account for forces at play that
people don't mention explicitlye social, moral and economic forces
that have prepared the ground for pharmaceuticalization much
prior to the post 1980s re-biologization of psychiatry. As I have
shown, judgments about pill-taking e when and if to take them,
how long to take them for, what itmeans to take them and to get off
of them e are made in the context of powerful and long-standing
morally-infused prototypes, or person-making projects. Impor-
tantly, this explanatory model also fails to account for the role of
economics, structure, pragmatism and patience, the complex
multi-institutional support systems that enable success stories
such as Juliane's. As I have described elsewhere, some of these
success stories occurred in the context of deep commitment to a
consideration of ‘the social’ as both etiologically and therapeutically
central, and they did not always engender a vindicating anti-
biologizing psychodynamic posture (Behague, 2009).
The explanatory model of bioepistemic authority is not just full
of gaps. It is also an enactment; it has a social life; its use actively
displaces. Explanatory models displace by using “desocializing
concepts” e e.g. “bioepistemic authority” or “resistance to bio-
psychiatric ways of reasoning” e that are linked to a simpliﬁed and
easily shared vocabulary that holds intelligible “surface meaning”
(Young, 1982b). “The power to displace,” Emily Martin writes,
“[emerges by] means of a reduction in scale” and the “mobility”
that is enabled through miniaturization (Martin, 2006: 282e283).
The (social scientiﬁc) explanatory model of bioepistemic authority
is also a miniaturizing one: it simpliﬁes understanding; uses a vo-
cabulary that is easy to share; and circulates rapidly, traveling the
globe in tandem with pharmaceuticalization itself.
What are the speciﬁc moments inwhich the impetus to displace
arises? I have shown that therapists and patients turn to this
explanatory model in moments of moral vindication (Juliane) and
moral discomfort (Rosane). Further, I would argue the narrative of
psychodynamic vindication and an explanatory model ofbioepistemic authority are being co-constructed precisely because
of the moral discomfort that cases such as Rosane elicited. Recall
that Rosane's therapeutic paralysis was lamented; and that Paulo's
designation of Rosane as a “therapeutic failure” signaled the hopee
and even imperative e for another way out. Medication is creeping
in precisely when therapists experienced profound crises, as they
opened their clinics and minds to the suffering of shantytown
youth with a level of intimacy not yet seen in the history of Bra-
zilian psychiatry. Thus, I would argue, therapists' attraction to an
explanatory model of bioepistemic authority increases in tandem
with the need for the medicating act to become a social anesthetic.
These displacing, or anesthetizing, powers have ontological ef-
fects that are important to recognize. By limiting therapeutic action,
the focus on bioepistemic authority e and psychodynamic “resis-
tance” to it e renders therapists and patients passive, more
distanced from complex ways of knowing, and from the conditions
that exacerbate or improve distressed lives. Thus, the very use of
this explanatory model must be included as one among other so-
cial, economic, moral forces accounting for the emergence of
chronic and stagnating biotherapeutic forms, the very kind of “local
biology” (Lock, 1995) therapists wish to avoid. This is not a gratu-
itous critique, for this same Pelotense world provides us with
exemplary moments in which the impetus for a personally and
socially transformative therapeutic form is realized, often against
considerable odds (Behague, 2009). And, though Pelotas appears to
be comprised of a unique epistemic tradition, it is very likely that
even in corners of the world where biopsychiatry is more
entrenched, a polarizing for-or-against positionality vis-a-vis bio-
psychiatry also conceals broader ethical challenges at stake in
pharmaceuticalization. What might be possible if we stared these
challenges and insecurities in the eye (Kleinman, 2006), rather than
hide behind a discourse of anti-biologization (Rose, 2013)? How
can we become more attentive to the ways pharmaceutical prac-
tices become linked to different value systems and not just different
epistemic rationales? Might we then be able to formalize the
structural and moral dimensions of the lasting therapeutic trans-
formations that do occur in Pelotas, and elsewhere? As these
questions indicate, I believe it is only by tackling the historically
entrenched ethical challenges described in this paper that I believe
social psychiatry will realize its full potential.Acknowledgments
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